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Civil Society Leaders’ Experiences of Peacebuilding in Londonderry/Derry City,
Northern Ireland: Transforming Cultural and Psychological Barriers
Abstract
This article reviews the empirical data the second author collected from 120 semi-structured interviews
with the leaders of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and funding agency development officers
conducted during the summer of 2010 in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties. The research explores
44 Derry City respondents' experiences and perceptions regarding external economic aid in the Northern
Ireland peace process. To this end, this article explores the role of economic aid from the International
Fund for Ireland (IFI) and the European Union (EU) Peace and Reconciliation or Peace 3 Fund in engaging
with civil society in transforming psychological and cultural barriers towards building sustainable peace in
Londonderry or Derry City. Themes emerged inductively from data. It includes the CSO leaders' and
funding agency development officers' perspectives on building peace and both funds' impact on the
Northern Ireland peacebuilding process. CSO leaders and funding agency development officers
acknowledge the importance of external economic assistance support in development and forging crosscommunity contact projects. The interviewees also highlighted issues related to political participation,
community competitiveness, and psychological barriers that emerge from CSOs working with both
programs. Some of the conclusions are related to broadened peace process interventions to a multiarticulated approach that includes different areas of peacebuilding intervention.
Keywords
Keywords: Critical and Emancipatory Peacebuilding, Civil Society Organizations, Cross-Community
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Civil Society Leaders’ Experiences of Peacebuilding in Londonderry/Derry City,
Northern Ireland: Transforming Cultural and Psychological Barriers
Leonardo Luna and Sean Byrne
This article explores the experiences and perceptions of 44 Civil Society
Organizational (CSO) leaders and funding agency development ofﬁcers within Londonderry
or Derry City in Northern Ireland. These CSOs received funding from the International Fund
for Ireland (IFI) and/or the European Union (EU) Peace 3 Fund. The second author conducted
semi-structured interviews with these leaders during the summer of 2010. The data is
analyzed from a critical and emancipatory peacebuilding perspective to understand the
potentials and challenges of CSOs using external international aid to create and develop
cross-community contact and peacebuilding projects. Therefore, our inquiry focuses on what
are some of those perspectives regarding the CSOs peacebuilding efforts supported with
economic assistance to implement projects to build peace in Derry? What are the experiences
of CSOs leaders in implementing those cross-community peacebuilding projects? What are
the respondent’s perceptions of the external economic assistance in building peace in Derry
City? The 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA), the 2006 St. Andrew’s Agreement, and the
2014 Stormont House Agreement ended the 30-year war; provided for a devolved power
sharing government; and clarified issues around decommissioning weapons, policing, and
former combatants yet the hostile polarization continues between two competing
communities.
We believe that the political events surrounding Brexit affected Northern Ireland
peace process. In addition, we consider that the ongoing EU Peace 4 program as the aid
recipients experience many of the same challenges encountered by our research participants
such as poverty, youth migration, unemployment, the loss of jobs, uncertainty, and the return

of political violence. In this context, there is a need to critically reflect on the IFI and EU
peacebuilding programs to explore their strengths and challenges that have a direct
implication for the current EU Peace 4 program. In this study, we explore some of the
peacebuilding projects directly impacted by the IFI and the EU Peace 3 Fund that invested
over €2 billion to build the peace dividend in Northern Ireland (Khan & Byrne, 2016). The
interviewees were from Derry and the Border Counties where the discrimination against the
minority community led to the formation of the 1968 Northern Ireland Civil Rights
Association, and the shooting dead of 14 civil rights marchers in Derry on Bloody Sunday,
1972 by British paratroopers (Byrne, 2008).
The article begins by describing the context of the conflict and evolution of the IFI
and EU Peace and Reconciliation Fund. Second, it outlines the concept of civil society and
its relation with the critical and emancipatory peacebuilding approach. Third, the methods of
data collection are then described. Fourth, the interviews of 44 IFI and EU Peace 3 Fund
grantees and funding agency development officers are analysed in relation to economic aid
and community peacebuilding projects. The article concludes with a discussion of the
respondent’s perceptions of and contributions to the peace process in Northern Ireland.
The Northern Ireland Conflict Context
The Northern Ireland conflict is embedded in ethnoreligious identities, deep
economic cleavages, and the manipulation of politics and religion by political elites (Dixon,
2007). The 30 years Troubles were a geopolitical ethnopolitical conflict that left
psychological and physical traumas on the civilian population dealing with their cultural
legacies that have kept both communities apart as social inequality and discrimination; a
damaged infrastructure; deprivation; and economic chaos impacted those relations (Byrne et
al., 2009). The conflict also involves the collision of two ethnocultural narratives. Both
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narratives reinforce cultural identity, history, and knowledge as the conflict became encoded
within the ethnic identities of both communities while the epistemologies of the Other are
excluded and that group is constructed as the enemy Other (Senehi, 2009). The Northern
Ireland conflict is a complex social phenomenon that necessitates using a multidisciplinary
framework that includes economic, historical, psychocultural, and political issues, as well as
religion and demographic dimensions to analyze its deep roots (Byrne, 2008).
In 1972, the British Government took direct control of Northern Ireland and appointed
a Secretary of State to implement Direct Rule from London to administrate the province
legally and politically. This intervention purse strings that reduced the risk of violent conflict
while the Irish Government worked in 1985 with the British government to introduce the
1985 Anglo Irish Agreement (AIA) that was a little short of joint authority (Byrne, 2008).
Similar to many other protracted ethnic conflicts, the Northern Ireland conflict was also
influenced by international affairs. In the mid-1990s, the United States pressured the British
government to negotiate with Northern Ireland’s to reform the policing service,
decommission paramilitary weaponry, and the emergency legislation (e.g., the Prevention
Against the Terrorism Act and Direct Rule), and withdraw British combat troops from
Northern Ireland (Byrne, 2008).
The international dimension brought an economic aid package with the introduction
of the IFI through the signing of the AIA, and the EU Peace and Reconciliation Fund after
the 1994 reciprocal Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries ceasefires (Rahman et al., 2017).
During the 1990s, international actors started to use economic assistance around the world
as they articulated their goals, policymaking frameworks, and bureaucratization in what some
scholars describe as the “institutionalization of an aid regime” (Woodward, 2013). In the
Northern Ireland case, the use of the international economic aid became visible with the
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signing of the 1985 AIA by the British and Irish governments that clarified to the
international community the possibility of using economic aid to promote socioeconomic
development in societies transitioning out of violence. In 1986, both governments established
the IFI “to promote economic and social advance, to encourage social and cultural contact,
dialogue and reconciliation between Nationalists and Unionists throughout Ireland”
(Buchanan, 2016, p. 86). Australia, Canada, the EU, New Zealand, and the United States
provided funding to IFI. In the beginning, the IFI focused on supporting disadvantaged
economic areas and after the 1994 paramilitaries ceasefires, the EU became the largest donor
increasing its annual contribution to the IFI (Byrne et al., 2009). By 1995, the IFI started to
support CSO’s conflict resolution and reconciliation efforts and by 1999, the IFI had created
new Regeneration of Deprived Areas, Community Capacity Building and Economic
Development programs. By 2006, the IFI reorganized its support of CSO activities under
four general titles, namely Building Foundations, Building Bridges, Integrating and Leaving
a Legacy (Buchanan, 2016). All of the IFI’s financial support of project activities ceased on
December 31, 2015. In 2014, the EU created a new Peace IV program (2014-2020) with
emphasis on children and young people, and an investment of €270 million (Kołodziejski,
2020).
In the past, the IFI was criticized for emphasising large-scale development projects
building white elephant and unnecessary services rather than to supporting more local CSO
projects (Byrne et al., 2009). These programs had limitations related to their complexity and
bureaucracy, while assessments found missed learning opportunities, the lack of
sustainability of CSO projects, and a low uptake in the Protestant Unionist Loyalist (PUL)
community (Buchanan, 2014). The IFI and EU Peace and Reconciliation programs have also
reinforced liberal democratization and marketization over prioritizing local CSOs agency
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(Creary & Byrne, 2014). In Northern Ireland, people’s perceptions of the IFI and EU Peace
3 funding has varied. For example, respondents in some studies in Belfast, Derry, and the
Border Area see external funding as an important facet of peacebuilding while other studies
have criticized the culture of dependence of CSOs on the international community; the
inflexibility of both funders’ structure; and the bureaucracy of the administrative and
reporting processes (Byrne & Irvin, 2002; Byrne et al., 2009).
The Role of Civil Society Organizations
Civil society’s role in the peacebuilding processes is essential and over the past fifteen
years we have witnessed an increase in civil society peacebuilding initiatives (Paffenholz,
2013). Peace initiatives in different conflict milieus promoted by the international community
supported local CSOs to nurture a constructive dialogue between the states and local
communities (O’Brien, 2005). These peace enterprises also try to engage local communities
in democratic policymaking processes by way of a plethora of programs and projects.
However, external aid agencies have paid little attention to conflicts of interest, the allocation
of resources, and power relations within and between CSOs and other agencies (Skarlato et
al., 2016). This assessment not only points out the complexity of working with CSOs but also
the richness and opportunities that emerge from this work. Some of the questions that emerge
from this complex dynamic are related to the nature of CSOs’ peacebuilding modes; the tense
relationships between external funders and CSOs; as well as the possibility that CSOs might
achieve their goals and contribute to peacebuilding.
CSOs play different roles in conflict milieus and in peacebuilding processes. For
example, CSOs provide services when state institutions cannot, and they can guarantee
human rights and peacebuilding democratic values through civic education, training, and
advocacy as well as by providing in-group socialization, mediation, monitoring, protection,
5

public communication, service delivery, and social cohesion (Paffenholz, 2010). CSOs can
also sustain communities’ security needs by way of the creation of peace zones, civil society
initiatives for human security, humanitarian aid, international accompaniment, and protection
activities (Paffenholz, 2010). In addition, CSOs can analyze what is happening on the ground
and provide guidance for international decisionmakers and local advocacy groups that
include local everyday voices as part of the discourse. CSOs have the potential to advance
attitudinal changes to forge a culture of peace within societies; facilitate constructive
initiatives between conflicting armed groups, local communities, and external agencies; as
well as providing humanitarian aid when state institutions are in turmoil (Paffenholz, 2010).
On the other hand, while CSOs with local and/or external support can build local
capacities and networks to forge new peace opportunities that positively engage local
communities sometimes they fail to provide for social justice and sustainable development
due to a lack of transparency (Byrne & Thiessen, 2019; Paffenholz, 2010). Consequently,
external aid agencies must continuously monitor the activities of local CSOs and recognize
that changing local people’s attitudes does not necessarily effect wider societal change
(Paffenholz, 2010). Peacebuilding efforts work best when an ethnic group works to change
the enemy image of another ethnic group that lies at the heart of their conflict. Consequently,
peacebuilding CSOs might have to specialize as they work constructively with local and
international institutions, community groups, and with their organization’s staff to implement
a broad peacebuilding process that realistically can be challenging for some CSOs because
they require implementation time; measurable impacts procedures; and staff capabilities to
implement projects on the ground.
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CSOs from an Emancipatory Perspective
International peace support agencies consider CSOs as the bulwark of democracy.
For example, in the 1998 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) the Peace Implementation Council
(PIC) acknowledged that the development of civil society was crucial for the successful
implementation of democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Belloni, 2001). The DPA
described civil society as “essential to a democratic society” and indispensable in promoting
“the healing of the wounds of war, to protect the peace,” and in strengthening the state
building process that included human rights, democratic institutions, and security and police
reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina that are central to liberal peacebuilding (Belloni, 2001, p.
167). Nevertheless, liberal peacebuilding targets both the formation and bolstering of
democratic institutions using abstract liberal ideas and processes instead of highlighting
people needs (Paffenholz, 2013). Liberal peacebuilding is also related to the ethical double
standards applied to local issues, the socioeconomic and political coercion of local
communities, and the complete lack of concern with local communities’ general welfare
(Thiessen, 2011).
Peacebuilding is complex and challenging, necessitating the formulation of
reconciliation processes to better cross-communal relations to advance constructive social
change that build relationships centered in love, respect, and trust, rather than fear,
accusations, and violence (Lederach, 2005). Authentic peacebuilding necessitates working
with local communities to support CSO projects that transform people’s perceptions and
provide them with the necessary skills to build their capacities in a process of ongoing
dialogue and negotiation to transcend the dynamics of deep-rooted conflict that requires a
long-term perspective, which empowers local people and societal institutions (Lederach,
2005). Therefore, the aforementioned discussion leads us to ponder whether liberal
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peacebuilding’s short- and medium-term implementation processes, which include general
peacebuilding recipes concentrating on specific laws and state institutions should outweigh
constructive conflict transformation that utilizes a long-term peacebuilding implementation
plan centered on local communities and their needs, relationships, and social transformation
(Lederach, 2005).
Since the 1998 GFA, the British and Irish governments supported through the EU
Peace and Reconciliation Fund, and the IFI, have adopted a civil society approach to
transform the Northern Ireland conflict to build trust, openness, and reconciliation among the
PUL and CNR communities (Byrne, 2001). For example, some CSO projects focus on
grassroots social transformation that includes youth; women and peacebuilding; crosscommunity development; economic development and disenfranchisement; and marginalized
groups and social inclusion that are connected to emancipatory peacebuilding (Byrne et al.,
2018). Local CSOs empower local people’s agency in a bottom-up process that is embedded
in emancipatory peacebuilding meaning that, “resources are not imported and imposed by
outsiders, but draws upon local knowledge and processes” (Thiessen, 2011, p. 121).
Therefore, framing local CSOs’ role in peacebuilding processes under an emancipatory
framework necessitates a critical analysis of external actors’ conditions to become involved
in local peacebuilding as well as understanding the impact of those demands on local
communities and on the overall peacebuilding process itself (Thiessen, 2011). In addition, it
suggests that the planning and execution of peace interventions must ensure that external
actors listen to local communities, and embrace local nonviolent conflict transformation
structures (Thiessen, 2011).
The critical and emancipatory framework illuminates that the local’s voices must be
included in field research to capture how grassroots perceive the role of economic aid in
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peacebuilding and whether the peace dividend is being built. One way to use that critical
analysis is to look at the tensions that exist between the local communities, politicians, and
the funders. For example, Bendaña (2006) inquires about the relation between international
economic agencies, governments, and NGOs in implementing macroeconomic policies to
alleviate local poverty. In these cases, CSOs can act to advocate local people’s demands for
structural changes that are critical in promoting social justice (Bendaña, 2006). An
emancipatory framework can also be used to analyze CSOs by focusing on local
communities’ agency. Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013) address critical agency in their
analysis of ethnic conflicts with regards to what they call the “local turn.” The local turn
places emphasis on:
everyday emancipation, political awakenings, resistance, questions about the
role of the state and authority of international actors and donors, as well as the
problems raised by the hierarchical state-system, ideological donor-system,
and the hidden arms trade and the goals of emerging donors. (Mac Ginty &
Richmond, 2013, p. 773)
Methodology
In the Summer of 2010, the second author carried out 44 individual interviews with
community development officers working for the EU Peace 3 Fund and/or the IFI as well as
CSO leaders in Londonderry or Derry City. The qualitative strategy of data collection was
made through one-on-one semi-structured face-to-face meetings lasting between one to two
hours. The interviews were performed in people’s workplaces or in other settings conducive
to their comfort level. This methodology is framed under a qualitative method that provides
in-depth stories of the research phenomena from people’s lived experiences (Bogdan &
Biklin, 2007; Druckman, 2005). Each interviewee was asked ten open-ended questions to
9

elicit their ideas about the role of economic assistance and CSOs in the Northern Ireland
peacebuilding process. The interviewees’ stories explored the CSO leaders’ experiences and
perceptions about the effect of the economic aid, the nature of the Northern Ireland conflict,
and the peacebuilding process itself. The research participants were involved in a myriad of
peacebuilding projects related to economic development, cross-community relations, and
sustainable peacebuilding. Following the research ethics protocol, we have ensured the
anonymity of each participant by using pseudonyms. In addition, all recordings were
transcribed and destroyed after transcription. Each person signed the research ethics protocol
consenting to his or her participation in the research. The themes and analytical categories
emerged inductively from the data. Forty female and eighty male respondents were
interviewed in Derry and the border counties of Armagh, Cavan, Derry, Donegal, Fermanagh,
Leitrim, Louth, Monaghan, and Tyrone, and we acknowledge that the lack of gender parity
in the participants is a serious data limitation in this article.
Building Peace in Northern Ireland
The research participants’ narratives describe their views of peacebuilding and the
role of the European Union’s Peace 3 Fund and/or IFI in the Northern Ireland peacebuilding
process. Their stories are categorized into 1) analytical perspectives used by those
organizations to build peace in Northern Ireland; and 2) the impact of the IFI and the EU
Peace 3 Fund on the Northern Ireland peacebuilding process.
Analytical Perspectives Used by Some CSOs to Build Peace in Northern Ireland
The semi-structured interviews included a question related to the respondent’s
perceptions of the IFI and the EU Peace 3 Fund in Northern Ireland. One of the themes that
emerged from the narratives was the respondents’ perspectives concerning the methods
CSOs must use to carry out their peacebuilding activities. The stories below are connected
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with the contact hypothesis, cultural transformation, and the role of political and religious
leaders in peacebuilding. For example, John commented on the significance of crosscommunity contact. He reported on this in the following manner:
Well a lot of community groups are sort of saying there is still an underlying
sectarianism. It has not been eradicated and it will take a long, long time for
that to happen. So, you just feel if it gets, if it suffers and it is not on the ground
that people might resort to old stereotyping labels attitudes and sort of feel that
certain sparks could reignite some of the things that happened in the past. So,
what we are saying is that if young people are actually meeting each other on
a regular basis or adults on a regular basis respecting each other; then, the
chances are that it will never go back to what happened.
You know too many people saying, “oh, I have met too many friends.”
I mean when I’d do courses in x organization, I would always say to young
people there was so many mixed areas in this town and now they are very
minimal. It’s really new developments are kind of mixed integrated housing
whereas the rest of the city you know it’s definitely one single identity housing
estates.
John believes that bringing people from both communities to live together provides
an opportunity to tackle group stereotypes to eradicate the sectarian prejudice that exists
between both communities. John’s CSO focuses on intervening with youth and changing
their attitudes via mixed communities. Likewise, John’s idea is also reflected in Joanna and
Brad’s stories with regards to sectarian behavior. This is what Joanna had to say on the issue:
I think we are probably more polarized. I listen to my children and I listen to
young people that we encounter and I think the divisions are as strong if not
stronger. We all have to take....There is an awful lot of bitterness left from the
Troubles and there’s a lot of people that feel very, very serious that a sense of
injustice and it is not resolved and that we have a solution that has no chance
to comment on and be a part of.
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And you know they talk about a democratic deficit in Northern Ireland
and when you talk about where we are here now. I mean we are very, very
polarized and there seems to be less of an opportunity to come together….
Work is one place that people can come together and of course as we have
more unemployment… there is still a lot of work to be done.
Similarly, Brad notes that Northern Ireland continues to remain a very segregated and
divided society and that the external aid has helped CSOs to build better cross-community
relations.
So, it is important that we do have this funding and I firmly believe that
without the continual reaching out and the cross development of our
community. And you know I would have a fear that we would slip back into
the bad old days and we would all go into our own trenches again, and there
would be no reaching out. So, the funding from Europe and the funding from
the various agencies have proved very worthwhile in creating this better
understanding and obviously the good relations that have sprung from it.
Joanna focuses on the sense of injustice remaining in both communities and the need
of working on bringing people together. Brad acknowledges the support provided by the IFI
and the EU Peace 3 Fund and how the economic assistance has been significant in
implementing cross-community contact in the Northern Ireland peacebuilding process. He
also articulates that contact is complemented with cross-community development and is a
real opportunity to improve cross-communal relations. Similarly, Simon recognizes the
importance of contact development yet he sees it as one stage within a long-term
peacebuilding process that also includes economic development. Simon reports on this issue
in the following way:
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We understand that in communities like ours that have suffered
multigenerational unemployment and poverty that a play strategy for the area
is not going to solve the economic difficulty that people have, of course it is
not, we understand that. But we are also pragmatic in the sense of trying to
engage the community in such a way as to say, “Let’s make a start with
something, let’s do something and let’s deliver what we can, of course we
have ambitions, of course we would like to do more, but let’s do what we can.”
And I think that would have proved to have worked for us and we continue to
deliver on that basis.
On the other hand, some participants mentioned the need to work for cultural
transformation. The cultural issue is related to communication styles; the use of symbolism,
practices, and traditions; as well as local people’s knowledge about the causes of the conflict.
However, cultural transformation is not an isolated action. It has to be implemented as part
of structural social changes that include the reduction of crime, drug consumption, and other
antisocial behaviors. For example, Charles expresses this point as follows:
When we go and deliver citizenship [knowledge about both cultural traditions
in Northern Ireland] it is a mixture because there is so many issues that affect
young people and not just community relations. So, you would focus a bit on
community relations, symbols, traditions, make them aware of the background
to the Troubles, the causes, and how things could be and you know the
consequences of keeping the Troubles going and the affects and so on.
But we also recognize that there are other issues affecting young
people like antisocial behaviors, crime, violence, an increase in crime, drugs
awareness. And even with all the scandal that has been breaking up in the past
year there’s a lot of child protection issues. So, I mean there’s community
relations but we also feel there is a lot of social issues too that we want to sort
of let young people talk about and learn about.
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Under the same framework, Brad also underlines the significance of culture in the
Northern Ireland peacebuilding process. He agrees with the idea that Northern Ireland has a
mixed culture that includes both PUL and CNR communities, and people from other cultures,
and rural areas. Brad notes the importance of respecting cultural traditions and communities’
ways of living to tackle some of the conflict’s causes. Brad highlighted the significance of
implementing a traditions tolerant culture as follows:
I think the Belfast Agreement was something that had to happen whether we
liked it or not. But I think by agreeing to peace doesn’t mean to say you give
up your culture or you give up your history. There has to be tolerance within
everyone that all cultures have to be accepted and we have become a mixing
pot here in Northern Ireland lately because you know we have had people from
all over Eastern Europe coming to live in our city to find work. So, therefore
there is more than two cultures or two traditions in Northern Ireland now and
you know we all have to respect that there are other traditions. If we can learn
to tolerate traditions, then there is no more cause for conflict, and that is
something we must learn to accept.
Many participants also mentioned the key role played by political and religious
leaders in the peacebuilding process. Some participants noted that the messages transmitted
by those leaders helps to strengthen or diminish local community peacebuilding initiatives.
For example, John communicates about the type of images transmitted by leaders that can
reflect some sense of peace development in Northern Ireland. He reported on this issue as
follows:
Well, I’m assuming there has been a lot of barriers and politicians have been
broken down too. There have been images over the past two years, which
people would have thought you’d have been put in a straight-jacket ten years
ago if you’d have thought you know you even mention those images. But the
fact of Gerry Adams sitting anywhere near Ian Paisley or Martin McGuinness
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shaking hands with Ian Paisley and laughing, you know that image would have
been just, you’d have been locked up, but it is a reality now.
So, I mean there has been a major, major development up there. I’m
sure there is elements of mistrust and there can be some. You know they have
been tested on a number of occasions of how strong a body they are. But so
far, they seem to have come through it.
Likewise, Jordan emphasizes the need for the grassroots to work with politicians to
lead and to implement the peace process. He focuses on the relationship between politicians,
local communities, and the wider society as critical in creating a genuine peace architecture
for Northern Ireland. He reported on this issue as follows:
And another example of that is that broadly speaking the politicians has never
been a focus of the peace process you know as if they are not part of the
problem. So, they are the people who adjudicate and say it is delivering well
to the masses and to the communities and those grassroots people who are not
rich, and is the money being equally spread about.
Where actually a genuine peace program should be about the
transformation of them not the sort of an assumption that that’s somehow
happening. But it’s not like, it’s not happening. But we don’t need intervention
on that. We need intervention with the masses with the problems, with the
masses and their screwed-up attitudes. I don’t think anybody’s ever talked
about that project.
In the same direction, Brad also recognizes the role of religious institutions in
nurturing good relations among both communities and CSOs. He expresses his ideas on this
issue in the following way:
We also recognized that if we wanted to continue to have our
commemorations and celebrations then we would have to win the goodwill of
a number of people from the Roman Catholic community. So, lo-and-behold
although we had no expertise and no advice or guidance, we set about trying
to create that goodwill. We set about trying to explain our background, why
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we had parades, why we had commemorations, why we had celebrations. So,
we set about trying to explain that to anyone that wanted to listen to us.
Now we were probably a bit naïve at the beginning. We were probably
a bit nervous at the beginning. But you know through experience and through
the goodwill of the Roman Catholic community who wanted to come on board
who wanted to understand what we were about, then we created and built that
good relationship.
In conclusion, some research participants believe that creating social spaces to bring
people together is significantly important in order to break down stereotypes. In addition,
these participants also recognize that values such as respect and tolerance, which are found
in the PUL and CNR cultures, can be used as a foundation to build peace in Northern Ireland.
Finally, they made it known the magnitude of the role played by political and religious
leaders in making peace. These participants disclosed some examples whereby political and
religious leaders have helped to move communities forward to work to create more peaceful
coexistence. However, they also revealed that there is a real need for grassroots CSOs to
work more closely with those political and religious leaders including those from both
communities to create joint peacebuilding and reconciliation projects that promote
constructive relationships.
Sectarian divisions, segregated neighborhoods, and polarization continue to divide
both communities yet the funding has assisted peacebuilding CSOs to nurture crosscommunity contact and reconciliation. As it was expressed above, relationship between
politicians and local communities under an empathetic level and permanent dialogue helps
to emancipate grassroots movements by resonating their voices and practicing democracy.
In addition, dialogue and cultural tolerance understood as the respect and promotion of
transformative diverse traditions empower individuals and promote peaceful relationships.
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More needs to be done by politicians and the government to tackle socioeconomic
inequalities to provide economic opportunities and jobs for local people and especially for
youth so that they can have a bright future.
The Impact of the IFI and EU Peace 3 Fund in the Peacebuilding Process
In this research, most of the questions were addressed to inquire about community
development officers and CSO leaders’ perceptions about the impact external economic aid
has had on Northern Ireland’s peacebuilding process. The respondents’ stories varied from
being more optimistic, recognizing the value of implementing the aid in Northern Ireland, to
more critical perspectives highlighting the negative effects of the bureaucratic process
imposed on local CSOs by international organizations, and the barriers created for CSOs
trying to get access to them.
The Significance of Implementing the IFI and EU Peace 3 Fund in Northern Ireland
We now focus on the CSO projects perceived to be successful and supported by the
IFI and EU Peace 3 Fund to build peace within Northern Ireland. Those projects can be
framed as physical infrastructure development, people engagement, leadership skills
development, and breaking down psychological barrier types of projects.
Related to physical development for example, Charlie underlines the significant
impact of the funds on the construction of community centers and playgrounds as well as
services to bring people together. His story about the physical development of CSO-driven
projects are explicated as follows:
From our own perspective, it had a huge impact you know. All those funders
have I mean at times its to get the balance right. If you look back the last ten
fifteen years and see you know physical development in terms of community
centers and play parks and services that every community should have, aligned
to the kind of less quantifiable outputs in terms of its impact on good relations
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and sometimes it is more difficult to measure. But certainly, if you were to
look at the statistics in terms of crime and other indicators then you know there
has been a reduction in levels of consequences and antisocial behavior and a
lot of it is attributed to IFI and to the political people who support for the
European Union peace programmed initiatives.
I’m full of praise for it you know if you’re looking at it. I’ve been
working with them very closely for a number of years and to say that apart
from the levels of bureaucracy. I think they deserve a lot of credit in terms of
both funding package needs.
On the other hand, some participants highlight the effects of the funding on the
relations between communities. In some cases, there is a perception that both funders help to
create good relations between the PUL and CNR communities that were difficult to achieve
before the arrival of financial aid. Brad expresses his ideas about this theme as follows:
Well, I think our projects have been an overwhelming success and the reason
why they have been an overwhelming success is because they have engaged
people from the other community and I mean by the other community the
Roman Catholic community. And with those people involved with us and with
their eagerness to come on board and share with us the Maiden City Festival
then that obviously has been something that has created the good relations and
the good rapport between two communities and again without that funding
that would not have been possible.
Another theme that emerged from the interviews was in terms of skills development,
especially for community leaders. Some participants narrated that the funding helps leaders
to improve their peacebuilding abilities and, at the same time, it provides a sense of justice
in the community. Michael reports on this issue as follows:
I would say our programs are capacity and I would think that you know if I
think of a project…. I think it has built the capacity of middle level community
leaders to go out there and do their job better and engage people on issues they
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hadn’t engaged with them on before with more confidence. And maybe that
leads to them being engaged in a personal community memorialization
process, which allows that community to feel they have got a better sense of
justice.
However, there is a belief that more work needs to be done in education, childcare,
domestic abuse, and health care as structural problems place people in a very vulnerable state.
Sophie highlights this point, especially as she refers to women’s struggles to achieve a
balance in their lives. This is what she had to say on the issue:
For women and what determines their mental health cross-Border, the
Troubles didn’t necessarily emerge as the first issue. The key issues that
emerged were we’re not getting proper education, we’re not getting access
through to education, we don’t have affordable holiday childcare, if we are
working we’re juggling work-life balance, you know the supports are not
there. We are living in abusive relationships.
And I mean we have seen huge influence here…of a national increase
post-conflict of violence, sexual, domestic societal against women and this
seems to be a pattern. So, these are the huge issues that people are saying on
the streets and the workers who work with them and the particular target
groups who are coming from marginalized communities like minorities, lone
parents, women living in areas of disadvantage, older women. These are the
issues that are paramount.
Now we moved on and in order to respond to all of that we secured
cross-party cross-sector agreement by a number of agencies, that’s councils,
health, Department of the Environment to look at what they could do to
improve. So, as a result of that there was huge commitments made by
organizations, which is here on the Border, where they said that they would
make specific improvements in relations to those areas.
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On the other hand, some participants acknowledge that the external funding works in
the sense of removing the psychological barriers aroused in the conflict. This has been
possible thanks to cross-community and cross-Border peacebuilding activities carried out by
CSOs and encouraged by the support of both funds. Tom brought this idea up in his interview.
Here is what he said on the issue:
But I mean thankfully the committees on either side of the Border because the
first ten or fifteen years of EU Peace 1 and 2 was really about keeping their
own house in order. But I think you know in the coming years well as long as
the funding is there and continues to be there will be more scope for that crossBorder activity. And getting young Protestants as well to recognize that you
know the merits of Donegal.
And there is still a mentality there within Loyalist areas, for example,
for your weekends off and for holidays you travel east to Portrush and various
other Northern Irish resorts, and never consider the beauty of Donegal and the
coast line in the Republic of Ireland. You know that is coming from, it’s
generational things. It’s just about breaking down that kind of psychological
borders there in trying to get people to realize that the importance of solving
them and doing it in the south of Ireland as well.
In conclusion, both funders are perceived as having a positive impact in the Northern
Ireland peacebuilding process creating the peacebuilding architecture, cross-communal
relationships, leadership training, and in eradicating negative stereotypes and sectarian
prejudice. However, the interviews also made it clear that the funding does not accomplish
all of the CSOs' expectations with regards to the peacebuilding process. Next, we explore
some of the respondents’ ideas that underline how the external funding has had an adverse
impact in both communities’ dynamics.
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Adverse Impact of the IFI and EU Peace 3 Fund in the Peacebuilding Process
CSOs also perceive that some of the funders’ efforts have negatively affected some
community dynamics that do not positively contribute to peacebuilding. Those areas are
related to the lack of development of democratic processes, the emergence of competitiveness
within and between both communities, and the creation of new psychological barriers to
peace. In relation to the deficit of democratic processes within Northern Ireland, Roger
mentions some of the existing problems with community development, especially the
relations among local citizens, the state, and the peacebuilding process itself. Roger reported
on this issue as follows:
But, it’s sort of interesting because there is a sort of recognition that there is
something going on there that’s not right between citizens and the state. And
there is something in Northern Ireland that’s not right between citizens and
the state and between citizens and the peace program and between citizens and
each other and between citizens and the new Assembly. There is a democratic
deficit, like a crisis is the wrong word.
There is a crisis in democracy in terms of what this community
development thing means and is, and how the younger generation look at it,
and how they understand what participation is in the Facebook era or
whatever. You know, there’s a bit of a crisis in community development
actually and how it is playing itself out in Northern Ireland is in these quite
stock ways of like you know is the old makings of community development
going to work in the future, what’s the peace programming doing.
On the other hand, Kevin highlights the competitiveness within the PUL CSOs in
order to get access to the external economic aid. Despite the fact that competitiveness can be
understood as a strength of capitalist innovation and what motivates political parties in the
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democratic system, Kevin articulates that competition is escalating conflict and it is bringing
fragmentation into the PUL community. Kevin had the following to say on the issue:
There is less goodwill from the Protestant community. What’ll you find now
is such a huge danger. What’ll you find now is that there is a lot of
competitiveness within Unionism in terms of getting access to funding
streams. I mean the Neighbor Partnership Board, for example, was set up to
streamline the community development but it has become a competitive
dogfight. Because it is such a strong infrastructure in each of these areas,
they’re scared over their own long-term future.
They’re just wondering if they are going to attract funding. Plus, there
is a competitive nature anyway where some communities will say, “Well I
heard X neighborhood got another payout. Why didn’t we get it? Or look at
the size of their community center compared to ours?” And it is just that
competitiveness and that is a danger and that there is a fragmentation within
the Protestant community.
Some participants mention the creation of new mental barriers as a third area where
the funding has had an adverse impact on cross-community relations. Peter reports that this
mental barrier exists because of the partition of the island and because of some of the
requirements promoted by both funders onto CSOs trying to access their funds. For example,
the technocratic and bureaucratic nature of the EU Peace 3 Fund’s application processes and
reporting procedures take peace workers away from their peacebuilding activities. It has
changed the relations between CSO counterparts working on similar issues that apparently
used to work better together before the implementation of the funding on the ground. Here is
what Peter said about this issue:
I think it ……we have a unique problem here because I think if they could
and they should and there ought to be more cross-Border cooperation
particularly for a county like ours [Londonderry] that is right on the Border
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with our neighbor Donegal. And I mean I have to say this…. maybe it is just
a general point. But what has happened is a consequence of partition in our
country so that a partition mentality has been allowed to develop.
I mean, I see examples everyday where the local Council, for example,
could work in closer harmony with our counterparts in Donegal. But it has
become conditioned over the course of generations not to do such a thing.
Where there might even be clear economic sense in doing it, it tends not to
happen. It’s almost like people have built an artificial wall there that they can’t
break through….We have an excellent working relationship with some of our
counterparts in Donegal. But the bureaucracy doesn’t enable us to work with
them in the way that we’d like to. You know we have the sense of two states
at work here all the time [the policies and currencies are different].
In conclusion, some of the respondents underline several adverse issues that have
emerged through the implementation of external funding in Northern Ireland. It seems that
the implementation of the IFI and the EU Peace 3 Fund has also escalated some issues at the
community level that are related to lack of access to external aid; an intransigent and
hierarchical bureaucracy that makes it difficult for CSOs to deal with; and the strengthening
of democracy over civil society development.
Discussion
The findings from this study do not claim to be representative of all CSOs working
in Londonderry or Derry City. Yet the findings are representative of the experiences and
perceptions of the 44 study participants. Nonetheless, the participants’ voices in this study
must be viewed as a window into the dynamics of CSOs operating in the city. The
participants’ stories are complex, varied, and contrasting. However, all participants have in
common their experience of living and working in a city that was embroiled in a protracted
conflict. The data shows that participants’ perceptions about the impact of the IFI and EU
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Peace 3 funding in Derry vary with regards to the outcomes of CSO projects aiming to bring
people together to coexist peacefully.
Contact involves the PUL and CNR communities tackling stereotypes and sectarian
prejudice, promoting cultural transformation in their place. From a psychosocial point of
view, the Northern Ireland conflict can be framed as a protracted ethnopolitical conflict
because of the general voluntary segregation between its predominantly PUL and CNR
communities. Intergroup conﬂict encompasses “competition for dominance between two or
more groups over physical resources, values, and/or claims to status and power” (Hughes,
2001, p. 528). At any point in their struggle for dominance over the other, either of the
conflict parties can exhibit discrimination, prejudice, and/or stereotypes against each other.
In Northern Ireland, encouraging cross-community contact through funded CSOs has been
an important part of the peacebuilding strategy (Tausch et al., 2007). Researchers have found
positive results in reducing prejudice between Protestants and Catholics and in advancing
goodwill through constructive intergroup contact (Tausch et al., 2007; White et al., 2018).
These study participants confirm previous research results indicating the reduction of
discrimination and prejudice using intergroup contact. However, the participants also
emphasized that peacebuilding interventions require far more points of contact than what
currently exists. It means that contact between the PUL and CNR communities has to be
combined with various other cultural, historical, and structural factors that created
opportunities for both communities to interconnect violently with each other in the past.
Providing cross-communal contact is just one element of a large and authentic peacebuilding
process. Many of our participants noted that other elements such as employment, political
participation, reducing youth drug consumption, and encouraging social inclusion have to
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work in concert alongside a robust social infrastructure that brings people together across the
bicommunal divide.
Consequently, the participants’ points of view are related to a multi-articulatedpeacebuilding intervention process that aims to encourage both external international
economic aid funders to stimulate policymaking that alleviates urban power disparities
related to poverty and inequality, as well as psychological and cultural boundaries by
promoting cross-communal contact. From an emancipatory peacebuilding perspective, new
policies should emerge to confront structural inequalities and power imbalances that lie at
the root of protracted and violent ethnopolitical conflicts (Abu Nimer, 2013)
Peacebuilding interventions can end discrimination by decreasing people’s
marginality and resource access inequalities. They can also encourage community
empowerment and reconciliation processes that allow individual and group-based feelings of
historic grievance to be expressed so that people can heal from the violent trauma they have
experienced (Oloke et al., 2018). In post-peace accord milieus, physical societal
reconstruction must also deal with the social and psychological scars that remain after the
physical violence ends (Abu Nimer, 2013). A multi-articulated peacebuilding intervention
process supported by international economic assistance agencies should prevent
competitiveness within communities by restructuring, simplifying, and streamlining their
CSO application and monitoring processes so they are less complicated and are more user
friendly for the voluntary sector. The peacebuilding process should also undertake to support
reconciliation and storytelling processes that prevent othering and the creation of new mental
barriers to peace.
External economic aid agencies must also ensure the empowerment of local people’s
religious and cultural peace values. Religious identity is an important conflict dynamic
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variable, and it becomes especially significant when political leaders mold their community’s
ethnoreligious identity in ways that locate their religious differences at the center of the
conflict (Funk & Woolner, 2011; Campbell & Peterson, 2013). The participants also
remarked that peacebuilding practitioners should preferably interconnect with their local
communities through their peace values rooted in their communities’ faiths and not by way
of humanist and secular peacebuilding values and methods (see Funk & Woolner, 2011).
Religious beliefs are often positioned to condone acts of dehumanization, whereas
emancipatory peacebuilding includes religious peacebuilding efforts to provide persuasive
measures to prevent the dehumanization of the other (Funk & Woolner, 2011).
Citizenship and democracy are an important component of post-peace accord
peacebuilding. Critical and emancipatory peacebuilding perspectives envision state-building
as a bureaucratized, fragmented, and projectized process (Stroschein, 2013). The CSO
participants disclosed that there is a need to work on citizenship and democracy in Northern
Ireland, especially with regards to the relationship between citizens and state institutions.
Many of our participants recognized that Northern Ireland’s political leaders must develop
and improve their capacity building skills so that the democratic process will benefit
everyday people. Working on citizenship and democratic participation aims to tackle the
power imbalance between bureaucrats and politicians, and citizens as well as among different
citizen groups engaged in funded liberal state-building projects. Democracy should be based
on the control of the power apparatus by the citizens to reduce the power disparity and group
marginalization (Morin, 1999). This runs contrary to the typical state-building formation
process logic that international bureaucracies are likely to recreate institutions and programs
in their own image that advance their interests without responding to local realities and the
everyday needs of local people (Stroschein, 2013).
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Conclusions
Peacebuilding practitioners and scholars trying to stimulate peace in societies
emerging from direct violence tend to advocate for using a “hybrid peace” that includes the
interaction between international actors and those on the ground (Mac Ginty, 2011;
Richmond & Mitchell, 2011). Northern Ireland’s peace process had shown some tentative
steps towards achieving a stable peace until the New Irish Republican Army’s (NIRA) recent
campaign of bombings in Derry, Belfast, and Whattlebridge in County Fermanagh, the recent
Brexit debacle and the call for an Irish border poll as well as the Covid-19 pandemic
(Haverty, 2020; Mapping Militants Organization, 2019). Civil society has played a
significant role in this peacebuilding process supported by the international community
especially through economic assistance to peacebuilding CSOs.
However, there is a need to look deeply at civil society’s experiences in Northern
Ireland in providing key guidelines to improve peacebuilding on the ground. This study
sought to understand local CSO peacebuilding actors’ experiences in Londonderry or Derry
City to shed some light on what has and has not worked in the peace process that could assist
practitioners in leading future peacebuilding programs. The results from this study indicate
the need for a multi-articulated peacebuilding approach that works at different levels, using
successful intervention processes such as cross-communal contact in alliance with
democratic

participation;

structural

development;

social

inclusion;

and

cultural

transformation. This study also acknowledges the importance of carrying out grassroots
research to encourage community autonomy, and to validate local people’s experiences and
knowledge in order to strengthen peace processes (Thiessen & Byrne, 2017).
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